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1 MR. CABALLERO: 
2 We plead not guilty to the charge. ,. 
3 THE COURT: · 
4 Okay; 7 the State may call its first witness. 
5 MR. PATTON: ' l' 
' l ' 
6 Officer Venegas. ·'· 
7 -, . ' : ENRIQUE VENEGAS, JR. 
8 having been duly · sworn, testified as follows, to-wit: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 9 .... .. f"l ., \; • t t 
10 BY MR . . PATTON: 
11 Q. 
12 














the Court? . ' 
Enrique Venegas, Jr. 
And how are you employed Officer? 
'• . . '·· .. 
I'm a Police Officer for the City of El Paso. 
In what capacity are you employed by the City? · 
Patrolman. ·· . ... 
And were you so employed in that capacity on or about 
December 9, 1977? 
I was. 
Now on that date in question, you carne into contact with 
one Zackary Brown, is that correct? 
That's . correct. • f.. .. l . , '· 
And you were driving down Magoffin Street by the 3000 










































Yes sir. · ( ,,. ~; r • I • JI1 
And that was at approximately 12:45 P.M. on ,December 9, 
1977? 1· I • 
Yes it was. · T) (•I . ,, 
And on that date and time ·in question, while you were 
·driving down Magoffin, you had occasion to notice one 
Zackary Brown, is that correct? 
That's correct. 
Okay, will you please explain to the Court what led you 
to first notice Zackary Brown? '\ ( 
Okay, we were patroling the area and we noticed the 
subject walking down the alley behind Alameda. 
Behind Alameda, and you were driving on Magoffin, is 
that correct? 
Right, Magoffin. . ' 
And .you had a view of the alley from the position of 
yourself on .Magoffin Street? 
That's correct. ., 
Now, were you in a vehicle or were yruon foot? 
We were in a vehicle. , ,, ,~ 
Is there any particul~r . reason, .what led you to first 
notice Zackary Brown in that alley? 
Wel1 b~~ause we noticed him walking and that's a very 
high drug .. ; • !:.f - ... ;,"'. 1 ..1 c... -
















1 Judge, .. I : object to the- characterization of the neighbor 
2 hood in one way or the other as high crime area, one of these 
3 terminologies . . The man hasn't been charged with anything but 
4 failure to .give his name. What people may do in the neigh-
5 borhood is .. totally irrelevant to the case. -
6. THE COURT: --
7 Okay, -overruled. ''· 
8 MR. PATTON; - ' .
9 Q. Was there anyone else in that alley? 
10 A. Yes sir, there was another subject wearing an overcoat. 
11 Q. What did you notice about him, was there anything 
12 unusual? ~ 
1 • '.... f '·~ .. 1 I I 
' ' '.. .. 
13 A. 
1 
He was limping, and as we approached them, (they seemed 
14 to separate, or .... ,1 ' ' r t • ~ 
15 Q. Had they been speaking to one another? .., ., ... ,. ·l f"_.) \.I 
16 A. ' ,We were unable to tell that, if that had occurred.-
17 ' Q. , But they were together, is that correct? 
18 A. They .were ·either together or they were going to be 
19 . , ,, 'together . 
20 Q. Here they walking toward one another? ' , ...... 
21 A. We couldn't tell, we just know that as soon as we drove 
22 up, they just separated, and if they were going towards 
23 each other, they went their separate ways, or if they 
24 I (_ . had been - together, they just separated. 












1 A. \ 2 Q I was unable to see · that .. 1 I ~·· \ .' Let·· me ask you this. You saw Mr. Brown in the alley 
3 ! along with , this , Qther subj ec.t, ~why then did y~u ~p 
4 J .. :} ~ •,..,' •··. :. j • ,..._;'I •' . 
5 A. Because it .looked suspicious and we had never seen that 
\,. I.,. o • I ... o 
6 subject in that area before. 
7 Q. Why was·· it so suppicious ·for him to be in that area? 
8 A . . . Because of ... 
9 MR. CABALLERO: , _;·l ~ 
10 Judge, · ~ere , again I have an objection ~o any character-
11 ization calling for some sort of conclusion that people 
12 standing in an alley talking to one another, if ,that's what 
13 they were doing, there's not even evidence that they were 
14 doing that. That being someplace with anybody is suspicious, 
15 there's no evidence of any crime. I object to any character-
16 ization ·as that activity being suspicious when it's not. 
17 THE COURT: · .. >:·' .. l.! (1 
18 Okay; overrtiled, · go ahead. , • t " ' r' " 
19 MR. PATTON: 







Is Mr. Brown in this courtroom today? ·· 
Yes he is. 
Would you please identify him ·for .~ the, Court? J .• 


























I ,: •· . 
Your honor, ~t this time I'd lik~ the record ··to ' reflect 
that the witness has ' id~ntified th~ ·defendant ' in this 
cause, 'Zackary Brown. 
6 THE COURT: , ' . 
7 The record will so reflect. 
















24 Q . 
25 
Now you were in your patrol car at the ~ime, is that 
correct, when you first noticed Mr. Brown? 
~es, I w.as. 'L:; 
And did you get out of your patrol car and walk up to 
the a lley to where Mr. Brown was? 
No, we dr<;>ve up . . , .. r. ") I o .-, 
An d y ou g ot out of t he pat rol car? t .:. 
When we approached, yes. 
And what did you ask Mr. Brown? 
We asked him what his name was and what he was "doing in 
t he alley ·; .~L ,, ,_ 
Are thes e t he only qu e st i ons you asked him at that time? 
At . that time, y e s. 
And did he tell y ou his n a me at that time? • t 
~o he did not. : 
Did ' he give any r e ason why he wasn't going to tell you 
his name? 
-19-
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At the beginning · he did not. ~- When he had his hands in 
his pocket we also asked , him if he would please take 
I 
his hands ou_t . of :_ his p_ocket, a-qd_ he did not the first 
time _~ ll'hec second time .he; did, and ithat 's when mT c ·."' 
partn~r . patted him down. 
Well. did· he give you any reason why -he didn't want to 
tell t'YOU what · his name was? 
No ·he .did not. 
He ijust · refused to tell -you his name and left it at 
that? 
The first couple of times we asked him,· he 'refused. 
You asked him for his name more than once? 
Yes. 
And on those occasions which you asked him for his name 
while there in the alley, he refused on all occasions to 
to .give .- you his name? ..... : • io. .~ ( \. l ~: ) ,_. I • • ... ~ . ,__ _______________ ~ 
Correct. 
Now, did you identify yourself as a police officer? 
We were in uniform and IAJe were in a patrol .car, it was 
obvious that we were police· off'icer·s. 
So you presumed that the defenaant would realize from 
your uniform and also the vehicle you were driving, that 
you were police officers? 
Correct. 



























you confronted 'him in t' the alley? · \ . 
He was very 'discourteous, he was yelling at us saying 
·; 
that we had no right, no reason to stop him. 
At :"all times were you polite and courteous towards him? 
Yes we ' were. ,. :• I '· I •'t 'f 
And yoii ' did give ' him ample opportunity to identify 
himself at the scene; is that correct? 
That's correct. 
And what did you eventually do when he still refused to 
identify himself? 
We put him under arrest, brought ,him to Central Station 
and booked him. 
I have no f~rther questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 











Mr. Venegas, going back to the scene, this was daylight, 
was it not? 
Yes sir. . . ' • J ... J 
In ·fact, I think you said it was 12:45 P.M.? 
Yes. 
And what -.;;..;rere the weather conditions like? 
Sunny and bright. . ' 
Now that part of town were you were, was the alley paved 
or unpaved? l' ' . , ... , ... .. 
























14 A . 
15 Q. 










And it has a clear ·view. In other words, ·'if you're 
going down Magoffin Street, you can just go .right into 
the · alley,-. can you not? 
Yes. 
You say you lsaw , two ·) individuals at· first when you and 
the other officer drove up to the scene, there were two 
individuals in the ·· alley, is ~·th'at correct? ·. · · 1 -,. 
Correct. 
This wa:s on · December 9th-? • l:: ." · ::-·;~ ~ J. , .. , " 
Yes. 
And one of the individual's was wearing a coat? 
An overcoat. ·I ') . • ' l l I 
Is that rare in El Paso? ' .c 
In sunny weather it is. 
In sunny weather it was, and did you ever stop that 
individual? .l 
No. ~ : · '- j 
You never did, and .when my client, Mr. Brown and the 
other ' individt.ial were . in the • alley., when you first saw 
them, how far apart were they? 
.. . , . . Couple of feet ." 
, .. . 
' r • 
Couple of feet, and were they facing each other or were 
their backs a gainst each other? i. l 
They were walking .·away from · each other. 
They were · walking away from each other. At that point, 
-22-
I 
r - 1 if that's the first thi-qg you ·saw, you don ' 't know if 
2 two people were just crossing , each other in the alley 
3 or ·not, . dd you? ~ 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. And you never ,did find out, did you? 
6 A. No .. ·_:."·. 
7 Q. Was the other individual, can you describe him by race? 
8 A. It was a black man. 
9 Q .. And could you des~ribe Zackary Brown for me? 
)l 10 A. H~~s a black male. · ~ 
.. 
. .l 11 Q. _:, How . old is Zackary? 
:l 12 A. M~d twenties, approximately mid twenti~s. . . ~;. 
. 
. ..! 13 Q. That part of town, is it rare to see black people in 
l 14 that part of town? 
.l 15 A. Ncl', it'' s not. l J • f, f' 
!j 16 Q. A~ · a matter of ·fact, would I be correct in saying that 
l 17 it's an area of town probably where more blacks congre-
r 18 gate than .any other · area? I' -, 
J 19 A. I don't _know if that's a fair statement. 
~· 20 Q. You don't know whether or not the area on Alameda Street 
s:. 21 r·, ' . right . between Piedras ( and three or four blocks east is 
5; 22 an area known to be frequented by blacks, officer? 
s: 23 A. It's frequented by blacks, but you said that it's the 
I"' 
.:> 24 -, most /highly populated area by blacks. 
'--,, 
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other area in town where blacks hang out, you see more 
blacks jthan you do on Alameda Street between Piedras and 
three blocks east officer? 
Yes . .. ··f:. 
What other area? 
Dyer ·Street. 
Dyer Street, lot of military people up there? 
Yes. 
So -it would be fair to say that thqse tw9 _areas are ones 
where .YOU see more blacks than any , o ther ? 
Yes. 
Okay, so you see a black person in that part of town is 
not unusual, is it? 
No, it' s not. 
Have you seen. do you know every black that frequents 
the Alameda area? 
Mo~t of them. >'] 
You know most of them, my question was, do you know 
every . one of them? 
No. 
And every . time you meet a new one, . do you stop him to 
ask his name? 
No. 
Did you, was there any action by my client that he was 
























14 A . 
15 Q .. 
16 A . 
17 
18 Q . 
19 A. 
.~ 20 Q. 




... 25 A. 
No •: ' E· : • . ._ ,. \ .. &./ ~ J ... 
The only thing you wanted to do was stop him and ask hi 
his name? ' · 
Correct. 
That~s . all? I ·l. .\.. 1', 
~--. '-1.. 1;:.~ .. :"' 
That ' s · a 11 . •: ·--5 ~ . 
J. 
And that's what you did? 
Yes. 
And when you did stop him and he told you, he asked you 
why d·id you stop me, isn't that true? 
No. 
Or words to that effect, did he say you have no reason 
to stop me? .. , 
w ~H •. ~._i.J :c~.~ r:r~it'\ 
Correct. 
And did you tell him you had a reason? 
Just told .him that he was walking in the alley and that 
was a high drug problem area . 
And · you asked him for his name? 
Correct. 
And did he; aside from what he may have said officer, 
did he kick you or ·become disorderly or push you or 
anythi~g like that? 
No. : ' - '· \. ~ . ..... 
And you didn't pat him down? 


















' r ..... 
(' 
1 Q. 
2 ' A. 
i 
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9 : Q. 
10 ' A. 














25 Q . . 
Did he l f ·ind an)Z weapons on him? 
No. 
Did you find any _drugs on him? ' ~· ~ J : • . ... 1.. l. , ... 
Np. .. l • C· :.n .....! ..... '. 
And once you found out he hadn't b~en committing a crime, 
and you asked him for his name again, did he give it to 
you? 
No. 
And what did you do . then1 I ·. ' 
We arrested him. ', r 1 • ~ 
And for what? 
For failure to identify. 
How many people have - you arrested for those things befor 
officer? , ' ~ 
That was my first. ·' 
That w·as your first. Is it, how long have you been on 
the force ·now? :l' }.._ ..... ~~ {~, 
Since October. 
In other ·~ords, you·~~ be~n on the force a little 
more than a month or so, · and you made your first arrest ·-
for failure to identify? 1·.:- ' .. ' 
Correct. ! ~ r t ... ... ... : r: ' 
Have you made any since? 
Make any since? 






































identify themselves? i l. ( , l .. ~ .. 
No. '· i. - '' r l ' . ' .. l •• 
Is ~ ~t . a rare thing for someone in the ' Polic~ Department 
to arrest . somebody for failure to identify? 
I can only speak from my experience. 
Well, . from your experience? 
Yes. 
All right, when you go to Police School, were you advise 
that it was a crime to refuse to give · an officer a 
person's name and address? 
You were told that? 
Yes, it's in the Penal Code. 
All right, but when you go to school they tell you, 
there are a lot of things in the Penal Cod~ . that . you may 
not know about, but they told you though that was one 
. •' .. •· I 
ot . the , things in the Penal CodeZ . 
Correct~ 
~ 
~ t. ' 
~. . ' 
And did they tell you that 'if ·.someone·, for absoluj:ely 
wh~t ever reason they hid, refused to give you, a police 
officer, his name. or her name, that you can then proceed 
to arrest him and book him? 
Correct. ·- • _ : :r ..... r... -
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Anp , w~re you e,v~r, · t .olp , s_ino~ ] then that you shouldn't 
have done:~ that .or make -sure that · someone committed a 
cirime, : ~~ you ·had reason to believe they did, or anythi 
lik'e that?. .. · • t :.: .• : .L . 
No, I have not. 
They've never ·.told y-ou otherwise? 
No. ~· '(J :~ ~ o ' I ~ 
The only reason you arrested him is because a person 
1refuses. to -provide his name, is that correct? 
·Right. 
Where did you book my , client, Mr. Brown? 
Where did I book him? 
Yes sir? · 
County Jail. 
El Paso County Jail, and he was placed in there the same 
as any other prisoner that yqu may have. picked up for 
committing a violation of some sort, is that correct? 
Correct. 
- . ( t ... ~ . ' o.l -· r 
And was there a bond placed on him? ' 
I believe so. ··· •, 
Do you recall the amount? 
No. 
Did you have any more involvement with the case - after 
that2 officer? 
No, I '' did not. 
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1 Q. Now when my client was booked at the County Jail, aside 
2 from patting him which your partner had already conducte , 
they searched him more thoroughly there, did they not, 
4 1) while being processed in the · jail? '\·: · I i ~I 
5 A. Yes. =-:.. 1.. I ,.. 
6 Q. . And do you partic±pate in that process or is that 
7 something done by the Sheriff of El Paso County? 
8 A. .. We give him another search before we take him to jail. 

















I believe he was taken to jail by my partner. 
By your partner? 
I don't quite recall. 
An~¥ay he was searched again according to procedures? 
Right. ,., 
Was anything found of an illegal nature? 
No. .(. 
Officer, after you made the arrest, because my client 
refused to give you his name, when you were on the way 
dmrotown to book him in the j aii, he finally did tell 
you what his name was, didn't he? 
Yes. , '' 
But he had already committed the violation, is that 












('<' _ ... 
1 Q. So once ·you had · his · name ', , it didn·'t help you ' any one 
2 -- way or the other, ditl it? .. ~ ... . . ~. ~ ..... . .. . ~ ....... 
3 A. T ••• -No. f -: ·' , ' r r l . • 
4 Q. But in your opinion, the way this law is written, the 
5 ·Crime had already been committed? 
6 A. Correct. < . 
7 Q. ~ass the witness. 
8 THE COURT: 
9 Q. ..· Did you ever ask .him vJhat his residence address was? 





15 A . 
Did he · refuse to tell you that? 
' Before we placed him under arrest, before we arrested 
him, yeh, he refused. 
· Including his address? 
Yes, . including his address. 
16 MR. CABALLERO: 
17 That's all we have, your honor. 
18 THE COURT: 
19 Q. Didn't you go to Corporation Court to testify? 
20 A. My partner went to Hunicipal Court I believe. 
21 THE COURT: 
22 Okay, does the State have anything further? 
23 MR. PATTON: 
24 The State rests, your honor. 












I r . ~· 
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1 Judge; we have a motion for acqu.ittal, and also we want 
2 to reurge our .motion; ~hich we filed earlier, for dismissal, 
3 'and we just don't think the evidence is sufficient for a 
4 ! ' ) l ~> • 
1'1 .,., ••, ! .. 1:" 
,. ,. . .. ·' ·conviction;· . •. ~- . 
5 1THE COURT-~~ 
l 
6 Those motions are overruled. 
•I 
7 MR. CABALLERO: ~ 
l 
8 I I Judg~, ·we have no ev:idence to present. 
9 THE COURT: -' :~: ·· '· · i. r ' . 
10 ~.. Then. the State rests and the Defense rests, both your 
11 motions are · denied: . . 
12 MR. CABALLERO: 
13 That's all ·I have, your honor. 
14 THE COURT: 
15 Okay, then the Defense rests? 
16' MR. · CABALLERO: 
17 Yes sir. i--:.· 
18 THE COURT: 
19 And do both sides close? 




22 MR. CABALLERO: 
23 Yes sir. , l . . "1' • .; 
24 THE COURT: 
..... .. 
25 ... ! ~ ·' . 
















1 MR. PATTON: ' . , .'I·; l' I ltP. . ~· , r , 
2 No argument, · your honor. ~ .• > 1'·..:. ,i. 1.~ •· 
3 MR. CABALLERO : . . ... ' •t ... \T ._ ... .... .. ()' \.' --, ~ i f 
4 ·· · ~ We have none, · Judge, . we've ·already stated our position. 
5 THE COURT: 
6 Ihen: I'll find the Defendant guilty. Is there any 
7 evidence on the punishment that either side wishes to present? 
8 MR. CABALUERO.: .... . • .. . . . .... \... . 
9 ! ~. ; .No Judge, we have no further evidence. 
10 THE COURT: . ; 
11 L . ·-- •Does the State have any? 
12 MR. PATTON: 
\ 
. ' . .· . ,,, 
-- ,J 
13 No evidence, your honor. · ... ' \ .. 
14 THE COURT: ··, t \ '· }: ' ; ' I 
15 Any argument about the punishment? 
16 MR. CABALLERO: 
17 None Judge. . ; ~ . ~ ~ . J' : . 1: < .l . , ... : .. ... ~c ' ~ ' 
18 HR. PATTON: ... ··-- I •! i 
19 No, your honor. . ' 
20 THE COURT: 
21 Does the Defendant wish to ·say anything? 
22 MR. BROWN: -. . c: 
23 No, your honor. 
24 THE COURT: _, . ...,, l: , 1_ t" . . . . . - . . . 
25 ,, . . Okay then, the punishment is a $45.00 fine and 
-32-
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, ·, ~ ('\'" 
1 costs. Now, since I do so few of these, I'm not sure whether 
2 ~I impose sentence or whether the Defendant has ten days to 
3 ,accept sentence. In case he does, do.es he want to wait ten 
' ' ' ' ' 
4 days or does he want 
.. 
'to waive the ten· ;days? 
; 
\ 
5 MR. CABALLERO: 
6 Judge ', we will waive. 
7 THE COURT: ' 
8 •· ' The Defendant waives? I ' so , 
9 MR. BROWN: 
10 . : Yes sir. 
,.· 
11 THE COURT: 
12 Okay then, in case it's necessary, you're sentenced to 
13 a fine of $45 ·~: 00 and court costs. Now we' 11 have to call the 
14 Clerk -up here. Now, once you have this commitment you. either 
15 have to pay it or go to jail, or make some other arrangements. 
I 
16 MR. CABALLERO : 
' 17 
.. l 
I I ... 
( 
Judge, my intention is to file timely notice of appeal 
18 and to ask this Court for a stay of the execution of the 
19 s ·~ntence pending the appeal. 
2 0 THE COURT : 
I 
I 
21 '.t I ~ Where are you going to appeal, you can't appeal to the 
22 Court of Criminal 'Appeals? ' 
23 MR. CABALLERO: 
'i 
24 Judge, we're going to file a notice of appeal to this 















1 and I as surne it's going I to be· to the Supreme Court of the 
2 United States. 
3 THE COURT: ' .T' r I 
... .. ,, .. 1 '( 
l • J I ( 
--· - -- --
4 Then we'll consider .that the Judgment, the Court will 
5 stay the Judgment; the execution of the fine pending your 
6 perfection ·of the appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 
7 Please prepare an order for :the Court t .o sign on the stay. 
8 MR. CABALLERO: 
9 Yes sir. 
10 THE COURT: . ,.. . l!. ·L 
11 Now if t ·his were an ordinary appeal, all that would be 
12 stayed when 'you .give your ,notice ·of appeal, but 'I don't know 
13 what the status is since it's under $100 fine. In case one 
14 is needed, it's granted. Now ; I we're · here · on the, there !.s some 
15 question now on the notice . of appeal t hat .. ~gould bring this 
16 case tQ r- this Court from the Hunicipal Court, and there was 
17 some delay tin the filing in this Court. And the Court Reporte 
18 and the Court Secretary were all looking for this appeal, and 
19 we were notified by the Municipal Court that t ·hey had lost 
20 the appeal bond in this matter. And I think perhaps we should 
21 have some testimony that there was an appeal bond. Do you 
22 want your client to testify? 
23 MR. CABALLERO: ' . 
24 Yes, · for those purposes Judge . 
25 · ZACKARY BROWN 
-34-
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Paso County Court 
v. 
TEXAS State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: In this unusual appeal, an individual 
challenges the constitutionality of a Texas statute which 
makes it a criminal offense to refuse to give one's name an~ 
---------------------address to a police officer upon request. ------
( 
-2-
2. FACTS: Because there are no opinions in this case 
and, as yet, no response, I must rely entirely on the juris-
dictional statement for the relevant facts. Two El Paso police 
officers saw appellant and another pedestrian walking down an 
alley shortly after noon. The officers drove into the a lley, 
stopped appellant and asked him his name and what he was doing 
in the alley. When he refused to give his name, appellant was 
arrested for violation of Section 38.02 of the Texas Penal 
Code, which provides: 
A person commits an offense if he intentionally 
refuses to report or gives a false report of his 
name and residence address to a peace offic er 
who has lawfully stop£_ed hj.m and requested the 
informatHJn. . 
Appellant was patted down but no weapons or contraband was 
found. On the way to the jail, appellant did tell the officers 
his name, but the officers told him that the violation was al-
ready complete. 
Prior to trial, appellant moved in writing that the 
statute was unconstitutional as overbroad and violative of 
his Fifth, Fourth and First Amendment rights. The County 
Court at law denied this motion. At trial the arresting 
officer apparently testified that he had noted that appellant 
was a black male and that he stopped appellant because he had 
not seen him in the area before. The officer admitted tha t 
many blacks are found in that area of town. The officer 
-3-
apparently stated that he suspected no crime and just 
wanted to stop appellant to ask his name. 
Appellant was convicted and fined 45 dollars. Because 
it appeared that no review could be obtained in the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals for a case involving less than 
1/ 
$100,- appellant appealed directly to this Court. 
3. CONTENTIONS: First, with respect to jurisdiction, 
appellant states that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
has previously held that where one is fined less than $100 
in a County Court at Law, there is no appeal to the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals. Coates v. Texas, 398 S.W.2d 869 
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1957). Hence, the decree in this case 
has heen rendered "by the highest court of a State in which 
a decision could be had" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§1257(2). See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 79 n. 5 
(1970). 
On the merits, appellant argues, first, that the statute 
violates the First Amendment because it is vague and overbroad 
and unreasonably infringes on a protected form of expression - si~ 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
393 U.S. 503 (1969). The vagueness of the statute is also 
viewed as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
1/ Article 4.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e 
p·rovides: 
The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have 
appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the 
limits of the Sta te in all criminal cases. 
This Article sha ll not be so construed as 
, -. 
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Second, appellant contends that the statute authorizes 
an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy and is there-
fore violative of the Fourth Amendment. Fourth Amendment 
benefits are not secure if one can be punished for refusing 
to give one's name or address where there was no probable 
cause or even suspicion that one had connnitted a crime. 
Finally, the Texas statute punishes silence and is there-
fore violative of the right to remain silent granted by the 
Fifth Amendment. 
4. DISCUSSION: The questions presented by this case 
seem substantial. In its leading decision on street encounters, 
Terry v. Ohiol 392 U;S. 1 (1968), this Court held that the 
police could stop and, if necessary, frisk where they possessed 
an articulable suspicion that a person had committed or would 
commit a crime. To the extent that appellant here was de-
tained by the police, the "stop" would not appear to have been 
2/ 
permissible under Terry. - Moreover, although Terr_y did not 
deal with the right of the police to compel answers to their 
]) (continued) 
to embrace any case which has been appealed from 
any inferior court to the county court, the county 
criminal court, or county court at lmv, in t..rhich 
the fine imposed by the county court, the county 
criminal court or county court at law shall not 
exceed one hundred dollars. 
2/ If the stop here was not lawful, then it may be unneces-
sary to reach tlEconstitutionality of the statute, for the 
statute only applies vJhere a person is "lawfully stopped". 
-5-
questions, Mr. Justice White, concurring, stated: 
There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents 
a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on 
the streets. Absent s ecial circumstances, the er-
son a preached ma not be ta~ or ri 
may re use o coo erate and o on his way. However, 
g ven e prop circumstances, sue ao t ose in this 
case, it seems to me the person may be briefly de-
tained against his will while pertinent questions 
are directed to him, Of course, the person stopped 
is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compel-
led, and refusal to answer furnished no basis for an 
arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need 
for continued observation." 392 U.S. at 34 . . 
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, also seemed to recognize an 
individual's "right to ignore his interrogator." 392 U.S. at 
33. 
This appeal would thus appear to raise serious Fifth 
as well as Fourth Amendment issues. In California v. Byers, 
402 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court upheld a conviction based on 
a statute which required a driver involved in an accident 
to leave his name and address at the scene. The Chief Justice's 
plurality opinion reasoned that the statute did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment privilege because it was directed at the 
public at large and because the information obtained was non-
testimonial in character. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966). Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion neces-
sary to form the majority, reasoned that California statute 
was .constitutional because of the strength of its noncriminal 
regulatory purpose. Although the information which the statute 
compels here seems similar to that obtained in Byers, the 
State's regulatory interest and the assurances that the statute 
-6-
will be broadly applied would appear to be much weaker. 
Appellant's First Amendment claim does not seem substan-
tial. If the First Amendment is implicated by a police offi-
cer's question, then every Government que~tion or question-
naire would seem to implicate a First Amendment "right to 
silence". Nor does the statute seem unduly vague in the 
traditional sense that it fails to give notice on the prohibited 
behavior. Appellant may have an argument, however, that the 
statute permits the police to arrest otherwise innocent citizens 
almost at will, and therefore is subject to the arbitrary and 
capricious misuse of vagrancy statutes discussed in Papachistou 
v. Citv of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
In sum, I think that appellant mounts a serious constitu-
tional challenge to the Texas statute. Whether this Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal will depend upon whether appellant 
has accurately stated Texas procedural law. In addition, 
appellant's summary of the record- in particular, his assertion 
that the police did not suspect him of a crime - may be challenged 
by the State. In order to examine the quality and contents of 
the record, I would call for the record as well as a response. 
CFR. 
There is no response. 
June 8, 1978 Cole No Ops. 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 
With respect to the issues of substance, the response 
(in the form of a motion to dismiss or affirm) makes two main 
2. 
arguments: (1) The phrase "lawfully stopped" in the statute under 
which appt was prosecuted requires at least the existence of the 
objectively-based suspicion necessary for a Terry ~· Ohio 
stop, 1 and that suspicion was present in this case: (2) there 
is no Fifth Amendment problem with a statute requiring a person 
subject to a Terry stop to give his name and address because this 
information is not incriminating, but simply involves the taking 
of non-testimonial evidence such as blood samples, finger prints, 
or handwriting exemplars. The state also argues that the case is 
insubstantial because appt was subject only to a $45.00 fine and 
a class C misdemeanor conviction. 
The reply to the motion to dismiss or affirm is not 
particularly helpful: it primarily reargues the points made in 
the petition. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE. 
If the statute is construed as allowing a policeman to 
stop a person and demand his name and address without any cause 
whatsoever, then obvious Fourth Amendment problems exist. The 
1. Terry, of course, focused on the susp1c1ons needed to justify 
a pat-down: it reserved the question wh~ther a stop solely for 
purposes of interrogation was proper. VThat question was answered 
in the affirmative in your opinion for the Court in 
Brignoni-Ponce, cited in the following text. People still refer \ 
to the kind of detention that occured here as Terry stops, 




state denies that the statute has this meaning, although it 
points to no state court cases construing it one way or the 
other. My brief research reveals none. The record suggests that 
the parties and the court were assuming that at least Terry 
suspicions are required under the statute, and the words 
-twa iW'-
"lawfully stopped" make that the most plausible reading. 
Even if the statute requires the proper level of 
suspicion before the initial stop can be made, however, there 
would still be a Fourth Amendment problem if the officers in this 
case did not have such a suspicion. The state asserts that 
during trial, appt's lawyer "indicated that he assumed the 
officers 'had some reason to make an initial stop and ask a 
question or so.'" The record suggests that this comment, taken 
in context, may have been made simply for argumentative 
purposes. The reply doesn't comment on this allegation one way 
or the other. 
Whether the police actually had cause to stop appt is a 
fact-specific question not warranting plenary review. I believe, 
however, that rather than simply declining to decide this 
question, the Court should at least considejL a summ~ry r~sal. 
... -wa 
The portion of the transcript attached represents the sum total -
of . the evidence against appt. To me it is patent that the 
officers were "not aware of specific, articulable facts, together 
with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably 
warrant[ed] suspicion" that criminal activity was afoot. United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 884 (1975). The Court 
.... 
4. 
might wish to dispose of the case on that basis rather than 
having to face what I believe is the more difficult Fifth 
Amendment issue that follows. A possible obstacle to such a 
disposition, however, is that appt's counsel does not appear 
have argued the factual validity of the initial stop very 
vigorously, if at all. 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUE. 
Even if the initial stop of appt was fully justified, 
there remains a troubling Fifth Amendment question in allowing 
him to be ~~punishedA for simply refusing to give his 
name and address when asked. Certainly the officers are entitled 
to put the question, but does a suspect have to answer it on pain 
of a criminal conviction? The trial court pushed the prosecutor 
rather hard on this question and got no good answers. But in the 
end the judge seemed to shrink from so bold a move as declaring a 
state statute unconstitutional. 
The Court's decisions on what kinds of communications 
fall within the scope of the Fifth Amendment are confusing at 
best. I agree with the preliminary memo that Beyers is probably 
distinguishable. There the requirement of giving one's name 
after being involved in an auto accident was justified on the 
ground that it was for a regulatory purpose not necessarily 
linked to criminal investigation. The plurality distinguished 
compelled communications "directed at a highly selective group 
inherently suspected of criminal activities." A strong argument 
could be made that those subject to a Terry stop fall within this 
category. 
5. 
If a suspect is arrested, given his Miranda warnings, 
then asked his name and address, my understanding of the law is 
that he is not required to answer. Even though the questions are 
routine and the answers are usually discoverable in other ways, 
the information sought is still potentially incriminating (as 
when the suspect is wanted on other charges, is a fugitive, 
etc.), and, when demanded orally, it is testimonial. If an 
arrestee is not required to divulge his name and address, neither 
should the subject of a Terry stop be required to do so. 
It is significant that what is at stake in this case is 
not the exclusion of evidence for whatever crime appt may have 
been suspected of committing, but a criminal conviction for the 
act of refusing to answer. 
--------~~---------------,-Perhaps I am missing something obvious or approaching 
this case incorrectly, but this case strikes me as an important 
one. A similar statute is involved in No. 77-1680, Michigan y. 
DeFillippo, Summer List 7, Sheet 3, although the precise issue 
there is apparently focused on the exclusion of evidence gained 
in a good faith arrest pursuant to a statute later declared 
unconstitutional by a state court. 
I think the case should be discussed. 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
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ZACKARY C. BROWN v. STATE OF TEXAS 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COrRT AT LAW NUMBER TWO, 
};L PASO COUNTY 
Ko. 77-667 :~. Dc-ridPd Oetolwr -, 1078 
Mn. J P8TfCE MARSHAL'L. dissenting. 
Appellant was eonvict<'C.l by the Cou·nty Court of El Paso, 
Tex .. of violating ~ 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code. which 
prohibits an individual from "intentionally refusring_l to 
l'f'port or gi v ring., a false report of his name ami residence 
address to a peacf' officer who has lawfully stopped him and 
requested the information. " The court i111posed a fine of $45. 
Pn<ler Art. 4 .0:~ of thf' T~·xas Cod<' of Criminal Procedure, 
r<'view in state eourt was foreclosed hecause appellant 's fine 
" ·as l<'ss than $100. 
The circumstances leading to appellant 's arrest are not in 
dispute. ~hortly after noon 011 December ~l. 1977. two El 
Paso polic<'nwn on patrol saw appellant and another person 
walking away from each othf'r in an alley. The officers drove 
into tlw alley , stopped appellant, and ashd him for his name 
and an <'xplanation of what he was doing in the alley. When 
appellaut refused to identify himself. hf' was arrested. searphcd, 
and tak0n to tlw station for booking. The search revealed no 
wPapons or contraband. 
According to th<> offic<'r who testified at trial. appellant was 
stopped b<'caus<' lw was a black male in his mid-twenties whom 
tlw officers had not rPcogniz<'d and whose presence i11 the alley 
thcrcfon' seemed "suspicious." The officer acknowledged that 
tlwre had b een no reports of crime in th<' area. that he had 
!.wen u nab1P to te11 whet1wr appellant and the other pedestrian 
had met or spokPII t o ea cl1 otlwr in the alley. and that th<~re 
was nothing in appellant 's conduct to suggest that he was 
• nned or 'had comlllitted a crinw. ·i\or was it unusual , the 
2 BROW~ v. TEXAS 
officer coqce(kd on cross-Pxamination. for blacks to frequent 
the area of El Paso in which appellant had been apprehended. 
This Court rPcognized in 'l'e1Ty v. Ohio, 3n2 l. R. 1. 16 
(1968), that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy 
under thf' Fourth Amendment is implicated "when<>ver a police 
officer accosts l himJ and restrains his freedom to walk away." 
To justify such au intrusion. the officer must point to "specific 
and articulable facts which. taken together with rational infer-
ences." would "'warrant a man of r<>asonable caution in the 
bc>lid' that the actio11 tak<'n was appropriate. " !d., at 21-22. 
Appellfl,nt here was stopped for 110 apparent or articulable 
rPason other than his age,. race. and proximity to an unidell-
tified pedestrian. There was simply nothing incongruous in 
appellant's appearance or presence in the ~ea to arouse 
suspicion. Pnder such circumstances. appellant's stop evinces 
the same quality of random intrusiven0ss which this Court has 
previously refusPd to countenance except at the border or its 
functional equivalent. Compare United States v. Briynoni-
Pollce, 422 r. R. 873 (1n75). United States v. Ortiz, 422 F. S. 
801 (197.5). and Almeida Sa.nchez v. United States, 413 F. S. 
266 (1!)7a) with thdted States v. Marti11ez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 
54~ (1976) . 
Since ~ 38.02 proscribes sil0nce o11ly in the face of inquiries· 
made pursuant to a lawful stop. the burden was on the State" 
to rstablish that the questioning was within the constitu-
tional limits Pstablished by Terry. I ser nothing in the papers· 
bdorf' nw to suggest that tTw Statr in fact madP such a 
showing. To co11vict on a record wholly devoid of evidentiary 
support for an rssential element of the offense violates the-
most fundamental trncts of due process. Sec Thompsun v. 
Louisville, 36Z U. S. HJO (Hl60), Gar11er v. Lo'Uisiana, 368 U. g, 
157 (1961). 
Accordingly, I would trrat this appeal as a petition for 
cl'."rtiorari and ~rt the caS<' down for argume11t. 
~nprtntt <!fcttrl c£ tfrt ~b _itattg 
~asJrhtgtcn. ~. <!f. 20~'!-~ 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BR E NNAN, .JR. 
RE: No. 77-6673 
Dear Thurgood: 
September 29, 1978 
Brown v. Texas 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 
prepared in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL September 29, 1978 
Re: No. 77-6673 - Zackary c. Brown v. Texas 
Dear Chief: 
Would you please relist this case 
for me. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
--1~"'/ ( • ,-,-:'";:/ 
.• . 
T.M. 
-. - . -
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Eric j ~ ~ 1--t- ~ 5'J,(_ tZ.u.~cc/(_ 
9/29/78 t? ~ 4,&.-(_ ~ ~ 1-o 
~ '-£<.. ~  Cttli-uz- "' Brown v. TEXAS, No. 77-6673 .---:::-- - 1-. • 
;H.,.;'f ~~--~:t.. ~-~ l 
According to the attached papers, although Mr. Just1ce 
DATE: 
RE: 
Marshall was the only one in favor of noting jurisdiction in this 
case at conference, his proposed dissent has persuaded Mr. 
Justice Brennan to join him, and TM has now asked that the case 
be relisted. 
As I mentioned in my supplemental memorandum, I think 
the Court should accept the state's reading of the statute that 
it requires at least "Terry suspicions" to justify the initial 
stop. Thus, there is probably no facial Fourth Amendment proble F 
here. Although I have serious doubts that the officer actually 
had such suspicions when he stopped Brown, whether the statute 
was constitutionally applied with respect to the Fourth Amendment 
is a fact specific question not worthy of plenary review. 
The Fifth Amendment question is more substantial. It 
seems highly questionable that the state constitutionally may 
criminalize the failure to speak to an officer who is 
investigating one for suspected illegal activities. 
TM seems not to get past the Fourth Amendment issue in 
~~--------------~ 
his dissent. For the reasons noted above, I do not recommend 
that you join him on that basis. Although I do think the Fifth 
Amendment question may be worth review, I assume from your vote 
at conference that you disagree. Unless you have second thoughts 
or wish to bring the Fifth Amendment problem to the attention of 
TM or the Conference, I think you should therefore adhere to your 
original vote. 
.§u:prtntt <!fattrllli flrt ~b .§tatt,g 
~rutfri:ttgtlln. ~. <!}. 20c?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
RE: No. 77-6673 
Dear Thurgood: 
September 29, 1978 
Brown v. Texas 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 
prepared in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
. ' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.$5n:vrttttt <!Jourt of tqt ~nittb .$5taftg 
'IDasirtngton, ~. <!f. 211,?'-1-;l 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL September 29, 1978 
Re: No. 77-6673 - Zackary c. Brown v. Texas 
Dear Chief: 
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The Chief Justice 




Kr. Justice Brennan 
~ Mr. Justice Stewart 
Kr. Justice White 
Mr . Justice Blaokmun 
- -_--- ~Mr Justice Powell 
/ , ~ffi JA _; _./'+" · MMrr :. Justice Robnquiat 
~=J,d~· Justice Steve-ns 
~~- rrom~ Mr . Justice Marshall 
let DRAFT 
Circulated : __ 2_9_SE_P_l9_l_S_ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAWculated : 
ZACKARY C. BROWN v. STATE OF TEXAS 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NUMB.b:R TWO, 
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ro. 77 -067~. ])(•(·idrd Odober -, 1078 
Mn. JPS'l'ICE MAHSHALL, dissenting. 
Appellant \ms convictPd by the Com1ty Court of EJ Paso, 
Tex .. of violating ~ 38.0'2 of the Texas Penal ('ode. which 
prohibits an individual from "intentim1ally refus[ing I to 
report or gi vI ing l a false report of his nanw and residence 
address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and 
requested the information. " The court ilpvosed a fine of $45. 
Puder Art. 4.0:~ of the Texas Cod<> of Criminal Procedure, 
review in state court was forpc]osed beeausc appellant's fine 
was l<'ss than $100. 
The circumstances leading to appellant's arrest are not in 
dispute. ~hortly after noon on December 9, 1977. two El 
Paso policemen on patrol saw appellant and another person 
walking away from each other in an alley. The officers drove 
into the ~lley, stopped appellant. anfl asked him for his name 
and an cxJ'>lanation of what he was doing in the alley. When 
appell11nt Tcfused to identify himself. h<' was arresteu . sear~hecl, 
and tak<'n ' to the stati011 for booking. 'The search revealed JJ(} 
weapons or contraband. 
According to the officer who testified at trial. appellant was 
stopped because 1w was a black male in his mid-twenties whom 
the officers had not recognized and whose presence iu the alley 
therefon' seemed "suspicious." ' l'he officer acknowledged that 
there had been no reports of crime in th<' area. that he had 
been UJtab'Jp to tell whether appellant and the other pedestrian 
had met or spo'kp·tt to e~cl1 othPr in tlw allfly. and that there 
was nothing in appellant's conduct to suggest that he was 
anneu or 'had committed a criHle. ·~or w.as it unusual, the 
2 BROWN v. TEXAS 
officer coqcedPd on cross-examination, for blacks to frequent 
the area of El Paso in which appellant had been apprehended. 
This Court recpgnized in 'l'erry v. ()hin , ;~92 U. S. 1. 16 
(19G8), that an individual's reasonable expectatio11 of privacy 
I 
under the Fourth Amendment is implicated "whe1wver a police 
officer accosts I him I and restrains his freedom to walk away.l7 
To justify such an intrusion. the officer must point to "specific 
and articulabl(;' facts vvhich , taken together with rational infer-
ences. '' would "'warrant a man of rf'asonahh, caution in the 
belid' that the action taken was appropriate. " !d., at 21-22. 
Appelll'l-nt here was stopped for no apparent or articulable 
reason other than his agP, racP. ami proximity to an uniden-
tified pedestrian. There was si1nply Hothing incongruous in 
appPllant's appearancE' or presence in the ~ea to arouse 
SUSJHCIOn . Pnder such circumstances. appellant's stop evinces 
the same quality of random intrusivenpss which this Court has 
previously refused to countenance except at the border or its 
functional equivalent. Compare United States v. Briqnoni-
Ponce, 422 U. f-l. 873 (1975). United States v. Ortiz, 42:2 U . A. 
891 ( 1975) . ami Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413 F. S. 
266 (197:3) with Un£ted States v. Marti:nez-Fuerte, 4:28 U. S. 
543 (1976) . 
Rincc ~ 38.02 proscribes silence only in the face of inquiries 
made pursuant to a lawful stop. the burden was on the State· 
to establish that the questio11illg was within the constitu-
tional limits established by Terry. I see nothing in the papers· 
beforf' me to sug~st that the State in fact lllaclP such a 
showing. rro coqvict on a record wholly flevoid of evidentiary 
support for an essential e~ement of the offense violates the-
most fundamf'ntal trnets of due process. Rec Thompson v. 
Lou'isville, 3()Z U.S. HlO (Hl60) , Gar11er v. Lo'Uisiana, 368 U. ff. 
157 (1961 ). 
According-ly, I v.·ould treat this appeal as a petition for 
certiorari am[ flet the case down for argument. 
.. 10;,., 
'----" 
To: The Chief Justic~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stew~ 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice BlaoJr:mwl 
~r. Justice Powell / :~r · Just i ce Rehnqu.tat 
Mr. Justice Steveae 
From·: Mr. Justice ~1 
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ZACKARY C. BROWN v. STA'rE OF TEXAS 
ON APPEAL 'FROM THJ;J COUNTY C()UR'l' AT LAW NUMBEH TWO, 
EL PASO COUNTY 
No. 7i-6673. Decided October -, 1978' 
lVIn.. JUSTH(E MARSHALL, dissentiug. 
Appellant was convicted by the County Court of El Paso, 
Tex., of violating ~ 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code. which 
prohibits au individual from' "intentionaJly refus[ing] to 
report or giv[ing] a fals~ report of his name and residence 
address to a peace officer who ha-s lawfully stopped him and 
requested the information.'' The court imposed a fine of $45. 
Under Art. 4.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 
review in state court wa.s foreclosed beca.use appella.nt's fine 
was less tha11 $100. 
The circumstances leading to appellant's arrest are not in 
dispute. Hhortly after 1ioon on December 9. 1977, two El 
Paso policemen on patrol saw appellant and another person 
walking aw~y from each other iu au alley. The officers drove 
into the a.lley, stopped appellant, and asked him for his name 
and an expla1~ation of wha.t he was doing in the alley. When 
appellant refused to identlfY himself, he was &-rrested. searched, 
and take11 to the statio1'1 for booking. The search revealed no 
weapons or contraba.nd. 
According to the officer who testif1,ed at trial. appellant was 
stopped becjluse he was a black male in his mid-twenties whom 
the officers pad not recognized and whose presence in the alley 
therefore seemed 1'suspicious." The officer acknowledged that 
there had been 110 reports of crime in t4e &rea, that he had 
been unable to tell whether appellant ~:~>nd the other PE:destrian 
had met or spoken to each other in the a.Uey, and that there 
was nothiug in appellant's conquct to suggest that he was 
anpecl or had committed a crime. Nor was it unu!)ual, the 
. . 
-
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officer conceded on cross-examination, for blacks to frequent 
the area of El Paso in which appellant had been apprehended. 
This Court recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16 
(1968), that an individua.l's reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment is implicated "whenever a police 
officer accosts [him] and restrains his freedom to walk away." 
To justify such an intrusion, the officer must point to "specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational infer-
ences," WOUld If 'warrant a man Of reasonable CaUtion in the 
belief' that the action taken was appropriate." lq., at 21-22. 
Appellant here was stopped for no apparent or articulable 
reason other than his age, race, and proximity to a.n uniden-
tified pedestrian. There was simply nothing incongruous in 
appellant's appea.rance or prf)sence in the area to arouse 
suspicion. Under such circmnstances, appellant's stop evinces 
the same quality of random intrusiveness which this Court has 
previously refused to countenance except at the border or its 
functional equiva.lent. Compare United States v. Brigrwni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) , United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 
891 ( 1975) , and Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 4l3 U. S. 
266 (1973) with United States v.- Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 
543 (1976). 
Since § 38.02 proscribes silence oply in the face of inquiries 
made pursuant to ~ lawful stop, the burden was on the State 
to establish that the questioning was within the constitu-
tional limits esta,blishecl by Terry. I see nothing i11 the papers 
before me to suggest that the State in fact made such a 
showing. 
Accordingly, I would treat this appeal as a petition for 
certiorari and set the case down for argument. 
I' 
. ·~ . 
~ .. 
t o "'he Chief Just luot: 
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The questions prPsented by the j'urisdictional statement and 
record in this case all relate to the constitl1tionality of § 38.02' 
of the Texas Pf:)nal Code. B'ecause the Court has not pre-
viously considered the constitutionality of such a statute, I 
would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument 
instead of deciding the merits summarily. However, I cannot 
j·oin MR. JusTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion. Appellant 
has not contended in this Court that his conviction is uncon-. 
stitutioual under the holding in Thompson v. Louisville, 362' 
U. S. 199. In fact, that case is inapplicable here because. the. 
record is not "wholl'y devoid of evidentiary support" for' the 
reasonable suspicion element of the offense.i' Supra, at --, 
*A8 i~ clear from the evidence describt>d in MR. JusTICE MARSHALL's 
opimon, the conduct witne~::;t'd by the police offirt'r in the allt'y was 
l'harnrteri::itic of n just-eomplt'tt'd narcotic~ transaction. Whrthrr or not 
thai ('Vldt'nrt' WH,; ~uflicimt to ju,;tify n finding that tht> offierr'~ suHpicion 
wn~ !'C'a~onnble , 11 plainly Hfltisfies tht> constitutional requiremeut articu-· 
lrued in Thompson v. Louisville, supra, that a judgment !Dust have ~ome 
PvidPntiary ;;upporL 
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Re: No. 77-6673 - Brown v. Texas 
Dear Thurgood: 
October 12, 1978 
I could give sympathetic consideration to a summary 
reversal in this case. If there are insufficient votes for this, 
I would hold it for 77-1680, Michigan v. DeFillippo. My 
third preference would be to note and have the case argued 
with ~eFillippo. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The C onf e r e nce 
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j)u:prtmt <!Jc-urt of t4t ~tritt~ ~taUs 
'Jll'a.sfrington. ~. <!J. 2!lc?Jt.~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE October 12, 1978 
Re: 77-6673 - Brown v. Texas 
Dear Thurgood, 
I doubt that I would vote to dismiss 
this appeal since, like Brother Stevens, 
I am interested in the question of the 
validity of the underlying statute. That 
issue is somewhat similar to the question 
we may reach in Michigan v. De Fillippo, 
I 
No. 77-1680, in which certiorari was 
ted on October 2. I would at least 
this case for De Fillippo, although 
uld note and have the two argued to-
gether. 
If the appeal is dismissed, I would 
not grant certiorari to review the facts 
underlying the stop. 
Sincerely yours, 
I 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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Appellant was 
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convicted and fi ed for violating · 
Section 3802 of the Texas Penal Code that makes it an 
offense for refusing to qive one's name and residence upon 
being "lawfully stopped" by the police. 
The prosecuting attorney at the beqinninq of the 
de novo trial in a court of record, conceded that the "stop 
and request for name" could be made .~mly if there was a 
"lawful stop". App. 15. The evidence in the Appendix makes 
it clear that there was no reason for the police to stop 
appellant other than his presence in a "high drug problem ----- -
area". The officer conceded he had no reason to think 
appellant had committed a crime or. carried a weapon. App. 
28-31. 
In light of the foreqoinq, I am not at all sure 
that this case presents the issue which prompted us to grant 
it. If there was no reason to stop apoellant, and the 
prosecuting attorney concedes th~t the statute applies only 
where there has been a "lawful stop", possibly this is a 
DIG. 
Apparently there has been no interpretation by a 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
No. 77-6673 
Zackary C. Brown, Appellant, I On Appeal from the County 
v. Court at Law Number Two, 
State of Texas. El Paso County, Texas. 
[June -, 1979] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This appeal presents the question whether appellant was 
validly convicted for refusing to comply with a policeman's 
demand that he identify himself pursuant to a provision of 
the Texas Penal Code which makes it a crime to refuse such 
identification on request. 
~ _1L,!? :45 on the afternoon1 of December 9, 1977, officers 
~~:~a_s ~nd Sotelo of the El Paso Police Department were 
cruising in a patrol car. They observed appellant and another 
man walking in opposite directions away from one another in 
an alley. Although the two men were a few feet apart when 
they first were seen, officer Venegas later testified that both 
~ officers believed the two had been together or were about to 
meet until the patrol car appeared. 
The car entered the alley, a.nd officer Venegas got out and 
asked appellant to identify himself and explain what he was 
doing there. The other man was not questioned or detained. 
The officer testified tha.t he stopped appellant because the 
situation "looked suspicious and we had never seen that sub-
ject in that area before." The a.rea of El Paso where appel-
lant was stopped has a high incidence of drug traffic. How-
ever, the officers did not claim to suspect appellant of any 
----- --
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specific misconduct, nor did they have any reason to believe 
that he was armed. 
Appellant refused to identify himself and angrily asserted 
that the officers had no right to stop him. Officer Venegas 
replied that he was in a "high drug problem area"; officer 
Sotelo then "frisked" appellant, but found nothing. 
When appellant continued to refuse to identify himself, he 
was arrested for violation of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 
(a), which makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to 
give his name and address to an officer "who has lawfully 
stopped him and requested the informatiou." 1 Following 
the arrest the officers searched appellant; nothing untoward 
was found. 
While being taken to the El Paso County Jail appellant 
identified himself. Nonetheless, he was held in custody and 
charged with violating § 38.02 (a). When he was booked he 
was routinely searched a third time. Appellant was convicted 
in the El Paso Municipal Court and fined $20 plus court costs 
for violation of § 38.02. He then exercised his right under 
Texas law to a trial de novo in the El Paso County Court. 
There, he moved to set aside the information on the ground 
that § 38.02 (a) of the Texas Penal Code violated the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments and was unconstitutionally 
vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
motion was denied. Appellant waived jury, and the court 
convicted him and imposed a fine of $45 plus court costs. 
Under Texas law an appeal from an inferior court to a 
county court is subject to further review only if a fine ex-
ceeding $100 is imposed. Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 
4.03 (Vernon). Accordingly, the County Court's rejection of 
1 The entire section read:; as follows : 
"§ 38.02. FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AS WITNESS 
"(a) person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or· 
gives a false report of his name and residence address to a peace officer 
who has lawfully stopped hnn and requested the mformation." 
-
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appellant's constitutional claims was a decision "by the highest 
court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1257 (2). On appeal here we noted probable jurisdiction. 
-U.S.- (1978) . We reverse. 
II 
When the officers detained appellant for the purpose of 
requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of 
his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment. In convicting appellant, the County Court necessarily 
found as a matter of fact that the officers "lawfully stopped" 
appellant. See Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02. The Fourth 
Amendment, of course, "applies to all seizures of the person, 
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of 
traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19 (1968). '[W]henever a 
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 
walk away, he has "seized'' that person ,' id., at 16, and the 
Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be 'reasonable.'" 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
Reasonableness depends "on a balance between the public 
interest and the individual's right to personal security free 
from arbitrary interference by law officers." Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 878. Consideration of the constitutionality 
of a seizure involves a weighing of the gravity of the public 
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interfer-
ence with individual liberty. See, e. g., id., at 878-883. 
A central concern in balancing ...of" these competing con-
siderations in a va.riety of settings has been to assure that an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject 
to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of 
officers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. --, 
- (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. 
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To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure 
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that so-
ciety's legitimate interests require* arrest of the particular ~e.... 
individual, or that the arrest must be carried out pursuant to 
a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct 
of individual officers. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at-. See 
United States \'. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 558-562 
(1976). 
The State does not contend that appellant was stopped pur-
suant to a practice embodying neutral criteria, but rather 
maintains that the officers were justified in stopping appellant 
because they had a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that a 
crime had just been, was being, or was about to be com-
mittee]." \Ve have recognized that an officer may detain a 
suspect briefly for questioning although he does not have 
"probable cause" to believe that the suspect is iuvolved iu 
criminal activity. as is required for a traditional arrest. 
United States v. Brig11oni-Ponce, supra, at 880-881. See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. 25-26 ( 1968). However, we have 
required the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on 
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at-; United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882- 883; sec also Lanzetta v. 1Yew 
Jersey, 306 U. fl. 451 (1938). 
None of the circumstances preceding the officers' detention 
of appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that he was in-
volved in criminal conduct. Officer Venegas testified at 
appellant's trial that the situation in the alley "looked sus-
picious," but he was unable to point to any facts supporting 
that conclusion. There is no indication in the record that it 
was unusual for JWOple to be in the alley. The fact that 
appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, 
standing alone. is not a basis for concluding that appellant 
himsel.f w~s engaged in criniinal conduct. In short, the ap-
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pellant's activity was no different from the activity of other 
pedestrians in that neighborhood. When pressed, officer 
Venegas acknowledged that the only reason he stopped ap-
pellant was to ascertain his identity. The record suggests 
a desire, not wholly unreasonable in itself, to assert a police 
presence. 
In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of mis-
conduct, the balance between the public interest and appel-
lant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of 
freedom from police interference. The Texas statute under 
which appellant was stopped and required to identify himself 
is designed to advance a weighty social objective in large 
metropolitan centers: prevention of crime. But even assum-
ing that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and 
demanding identification from an individual without any 
specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, 
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. 
When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk 
of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable 
limits. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at - (slip op., at 
12-13). 
The applica.tion of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 to detain 
appellant and require him to identify himself violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable 
suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or was about to 
engage in criminal conduct.2 Accordingly, appellant may not 
be punished for refusing to identify himself, and the conviction 
is reverRed. 
Reversed. 
2 We nPt'd not decide whether an individual may be punished for refus-
ing to identify him~elf in the conte>.1: of a lawful investigatory sto11 which 
sati:sfie::; Fourth Amendment requirements. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
34 (19G8) (WHI1'E, J .. concurring). The County Court judge who con-
virtrd appellant was troubled by this que:stion , as shown by the colloqu)~ 
set out in 1lw App<:ndix. 
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APPENDIX 
"THE COURT: ... What do you think about if you stop 
a person lawfully, and then if he doesn't want to talk to you, 
you put him in jail for committing a crime. 
"MR. PATTON [Prosecutor·!: Well first of all , I would 
question the Defendant's statement in his motion that the 
First Amendment gives an individual the right to silence. 
"THE COl RT: ... I 'm asking you why should the State 
put you i11 jail because you don 't want to say anything. 
"MR. PATTON: \Veil, I think there 's certain interests that 
have to be viewed. 
"THE COURT: Okay, I'd like you to tell me what those 
are. 
"MR. PATTON : Well, the Governmental interest to main-
tain the safety and security of the society and the citizens to 
live in the society, and there are certainly strong Governmen-
tal interests in that direction and because of that, these inter-
ests outweigh the interests of an individual for a certain 
amount of iutrusion upon his JWrsonal liberty. I think these 
Governmental interests outweigh the individual's interests in 
this respect, as far as simply asking an individual for his 11ame 
and address under the proper circumstances. 
"THE COPRT: But why should it · be a crime not tp 
answer? 
"MR. PATTON: Again, I can only contend that if an 
answer is not given, it tends to disrupt. 
"THE COURT: What does it disrupt"? 
"MR. PATTON: I thi11k it tends to disrupt the goal of this 
society to maintain security over its citizens to make sure they 
are secure in their gains and their homes. 
"THE COFRT : How does that secure anybody by forcing 
them. under penalty of being prosecuted, to giving their name 
and address. even though they are lawfully stopped? 
"MR. PATTON: Well I, you know, under the circumstances 
in which some individuals would be lawfully stopped, it's pre-
77 -6673-0PINION 
BROWN v. TEXAS 7 
sumed that perhaps this individual is up to something, and 
the officer is doing his duty simply to find out the individual's 
name and address, and to determine what exactly is going on. 
"THE COURT: I'm uot questioning, I'm not asking 
whether the officer shouldn't ask questions. I'm sure they 
should ask everything they possibly could find out. What 
I'm asking is what's the State's interest in putting a man in 
jail because he doesn't want to answer something. I realize 
lots of times an officer will give a defendant a Miranda warn-
ing which means a defendant doesn't have to make a state-
ment. Lots of defendants go ahead and confess, which is fine 
if they want to do that. But if they don't confess. you can't 
put them in jail, can you, for refusing to confess to a crime?" 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
No. 77-6673 
Zackary C. Brown, Appellant, I On Appeal from the County 
v. Court at Law Number Two, 
State of Texas. El Paso County, Texas. 
[June -, 1979] 
MR. CHIEF Jus·rrcE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This appeal presents the question whether appellant was 
validly convicted for refusing to comply with a policeman's 
demand that he identify himself pursuant to a provision of 
the Texas Penal Code which makes it a crime to refuse such 
identification on request. 
I 
At 12:45 on the afternoon of December 9, 1977, officers 
Venegas and Sotelo of the El Paso Police Department were 
cruising in a patrol car. They observed appellant and another 
man walking in opposite directions away from one another in 
an alley. Although the two men were a few feet apart when 
they first were seen. officer Venegas later testified that both 
officers believed the two had been together or were about to 
meet until the patrol car appeared. 
The car entered the alley, and officer Venegas got out and 
asked appellant to identify himself and explain what he was 
doing there. The other man was not questioned or detained. 
The officer testified that he stopped appellant because the 
situation "looked suspicious and we had never seen that sub-
ject in that area before." The area of El Paso where appel-
lant was stopped has a high incidence of drug traffic. How-
ever, the officers did not claim to suspect appellant of any 
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specific misconduct, nor did they have any reason to believe 
that he was armed. 
Appellant refused to identify himself and angrily asserted 
that the officers had no right to stop him. Officer Venegas 
replied that he was in a "high drug problem area"; officer 
Sotelo then "frisked" appellant, but found nothing. 
When appellant continued to refuse to identify himself, he 
was arrested for violation of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 
(a), which makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to 
give his name and address to an officer "who has lawfully 
stopped him and requested the information." 1 Following 
the arrest the officers searched appellant; nothing untoward 
was found. 
While being taken to the El Paso County Jail appellant 
identified himself. Nonetheless, he was held in custody and 
charged with violating § 38.02 (a). When he was booked he 
was routinely searched a third time. Appellant was convicted 
in the El Paso Municipal Court and fined $20 plus court costs 
for violation of § 38'.02. He then exercised his right under 
Texas law to a trial de novo in the El Paso County Court. 
There, he moved to set aside the information on the ground 
that § 38.02 (a) of the Texas Penal Code violated the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments and was unconstitutionally 
vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
motion was denied. Appellant waived jury, and the court 
convicted him and imposed a fine of $45 plus court costs. 
Under Texas la.w an appeal from an inferior court to a 
county court is subject to further review only if a fine ex-
ceeding $100 is imposed. Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 
4.03 (Vernon). Accordingly, the County Court's rejection of 
1 The entirE' section rE>ads as followb : 
"§ 38.02. FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AS WITNESS 
"(a) person commits an offE>nse if he intentionally refuses to report or 
gives a fal8e report of his name and residence address to a peace officer 
who has lawfully stopped hnn and requested the information." · 
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appellant's constitutional claims was a decision "by the highest 
court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257 (2). On appeal here we noted probable jurisdiction. 
-U.S.- (1978). We reverse. 
II 
When the officers detained appellant for the purpose of 
requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of 
his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment. In convicting appellant, the County Court necessarily 
found as a matter of fact that the officers "lawfully stopped" 
appellant. See Texas Penal Code Ann. ~ 38.02. The Fourth 
Amendment, of course, "applies to all seizures of the person, 
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of 
traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19 ( 1968). '[W]henever a 
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 
walk away, he has "seized" that person,' id., at 16, and the 
Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be 'reasonable.'" 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
Reasonableness depends "on a balance between the public 
interest and the individual's right to personal security free 
from arbitra.ry interference by law officers." Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 109 ( 1977); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, supra, at 878. Consideration of the constitutionality 
of a seizure involves a weighing of the gravity of the public 
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interfer-
ence with individual liberty. See, e. g., id., at 878-883. 
A central concern in balancing ~these competing con-
siderations in a variety of settings has been to assure that an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject 
to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of 
officers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 44.0 U. S. --, 
- (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. 
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To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure 
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that so-
ciety's legitimate interests require~ arrest of the particular -d-e-
individual, or that the arrest must be carried out pursuant to 
a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct 
of individual officers. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at-. See 
United States "· Mar·tinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 558-562 
(1976). 
The State does not contend that appellant was stopped pur-
suant to a practice embodying neutral criteria, but rather 
maintains that the officers were justified in stopping appellant 
because they had a "reasouable, articulable suspicion that a 
crime had just been, was being, or was about to be com-
mitted." We have recognized that an officer may detain a 
suspect briefly for questioning although he does not have 
"probable cause" to believe that the suspect is i11volved in 
criminal activity. as is required for a traditional arrest. 
United States v. Brig11oni-Ponce, supra, at 880-881. See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. R. 1, 25-26 (1968). However, we have 
required the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on 
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at-; United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882- 883; sec also Lanzetta v. l\'ew 
Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1938). 
None of the circumstances preceding the officers' detention 
of appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that he was in-
volved in criminal conduct. Officer Venegas testified at 
appellant's trial that the situation in the alley "looked sus-
picious," but he was unable to point to any facts supporting 
that conclusion. There is no indication in the record that it 
was unusual for people to be in the alley. The fact that 
appellant was i11 a neighborhood frequented by drug users, 
standing alone. is not a basis for concluding that appellant 
himseU was €ngaged in criniinal conduct. In short, the ap-
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pellant's activity was no differellt from the activity of other 
pedestrians in that neighborhood. When pressed, officer 
Venegas acknowledged that the only reason he stopped ap-
pellant was to ascertain his identity. The record suggests 
a desire, not wholly unreasonable in itself, to assert a police 
presence. 
In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of mis-
conduct, the balance between the public interest and appel-
lant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of 
freedom from police interference. The Texas statute under 
which appellant was stopped and required to identify himself 
is designed to advance a weighty social objective in large 
metropolitan centers: prevention of crime. But even assum-
ing that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and 
demanding identification from an individual without any 
specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, 
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. 
When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk 
of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable 
limits. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at - (slip op., at 
12-13). 
The applica.tion of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.02 to detain 
appellant and require him to identify himself violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable 
suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or was about to 
engage in criminal conduct.2 Accordingly, appellant may not 
be punished for refusing to identify himself, and the conviction 
is reven;ed. 
Reversed. 
2 We need not decide whether an individual may be punished for refus-
ing 10 identify him~elf in the context of a lawful investigatory stop which 
sati~fies Fourth Amendment requin·ments. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
34 (1968) (WHiTE, J .. concurring). The County Court judge who con-
vir-trd appellant was troubled by this question, as shown by the colloqu)~ 
set oul in the Appendix. 
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"THE COURT: ... What do you think about if you stop 
a person lawfully, and then if he do<:>sn't want to talk to you, 
you put him in jail for committing a crime. 
"MR. PATTON [Prosccutor.J: Well first of all , I would 
question the Defendant's statem<:>nt in his motion that the 
First Amendment gives an individual the right to silence. 
"THE COl RT: ... I'm aski11g you why should the State 
put you iri jail because you don't want to say anything. 
"MR. PATTON: Well, I think there 's certain interests that 
have to be viewed. 
"THE COURT: Okay. I'd like you to tell me what those 
are. 
"MR. PATTON : Well, the Governmental interest to main-
tain the safety and security of the society and the citizens to 
live in the society, and there are certainly strong Governmen-
tal interests in that direction and because of that, these inter-
ests outweigh the interests of an individual for a certain 
amount of intrusion upon his p<:>rsonalliberty. I think these 
Governmental interests outweigh the individual's interests in 
this respect, as far as simply asking an individual for his name 
and address under the proper circumstances. 
"THE COURT: But why should it · be a crime not tp 
answer? 
"MR. PATTON: Again. I can only contend that if an 
answer is not given, it tends to disrupt. 
"THE COURT: vVhat does it disrupt'? 
"MR. PATTON: I think it tends to disrupt the goal of this 
society to maintain security over its citizens to make sure they 
are secure in their gains and their homes. 
"THE COURT: How does that secure anybody by forcing 
them. under penalty of being prosecuted. to giving their name 
a.nd address. even though they are lawfully stopped'? 
"MR. PATTON: Well I. you know, under the circumstances 
in which some individual would be lawfully stopped, it's pre-
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sumed that perhaps this individual is up to something, and 
the officer is doing his duty simply to find out the individual's 
name and address, and to determine what exactly is going on. 
"THE COURT: I'm not questioning, I'm not asking 
whether the officer shouldn't ask questions. I'm sure they 
should ask everything they possibly could find out. What 
I'm asking is what's the State's interest in putting a man in 
jail because he doesn't want to answer something. I realize 
lots of times an officer will give a defendant a Miranda warn-
ing which means a defendant doesn't have to make a state-
ment. Lots of defendants go ahead and confess, which is fine 
if they want to do that. But if they don't confess, you can't 
put them in jail, can you, for refusing to confess to a crime?" 
App. 15-17 (emphasis added) . 
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